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THE NOT-SO-SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT: WHY WE




When Congress enacted the Safe Drinking Water Act in 1974, it
gave the Environmental Protection Agency the power to set national stan-
dards governing the maximum acceptable levels of water-contaminates in
public water systems.' Section 300f of the Safe Drinking Water Act man-
dates regulation of any contaminant that may adversely affect human
health, "in the judgment of the Administrator."2 The Safe Drinking Water
Act also authorizes states to create specific regulations to protect their
underground drinking water sources, as long as each state complies with
the EPA's minimum requirements and receives EPA approval.3 The Safe
Drinking Water Act requires that any state wishing to create its own regu-
latory regime must incorporate a plan to regulate industrial underground
extraction processes known as "underground injection control" programs.4
Most industrial extraction processes involve the injection of "propping
agents," such as sand, water, nitrogen, and diesel fuel into underground
gas or oil reservoirs. These agents are used to pry open gaps in under-
ground reservoirs to allow the fluids to flow toward the collection and
production chambers quickly and efficiently.5
* J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2009. B.S.B.A. University of Richmond, 2006.
Thanks to my family and friends for all their support.
' Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523 §2(a), 88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300f et seq. (2000)).
2 42 U.S.C. § 300f (2000).
'See 42 U.S.C. § 300h-1 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2 (2000).
4 42 U.S.C. § 300h-1(b) (2000). See also Nicholas A. Robinson, Environmental Controls:
Drinking Water Regulation, 10 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 675, 678 (1975) (noting that
states are given primary enforcement authority to regulate underground drinking water
safety standards only after they have adopted regulations and enforcement programs
that are at least as strict as the federal standards).
5 U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF
DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE RESERVOIRS, ES-4,
ES-12 (2004), available at http'J/www.epa.gov/OGWDW/uiclwellscoalbedmethanestudy
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Despite efforts to create regulatory uniformity among the states,
the EPA granted statutory exemption to a process known as 'hydraulic
fracturing,' in which highly pressurized-fluids (propping agents) bombard
underground coalbed methane reservoirs, releasing natural oil and gas.6
Intense debate has spawned over why a process that is so similar in sub-
stance to one which is heavily regulated under the Safe Drinking Water
Act is exempt from federal regulation.7 The formal battle over whether
the Safe Drinking Water Act must regulate hydraulic fracturing began
in 1997, when the Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation, Inc. filed
a petition asking the EPA to withdraw its approval of Alabama's under-
ground injection program.8 Specifically, LEAF alleged that the Alabama
underground injection control program was inadequate because it com-
pletely failed to regulate methane hydraulic fracturing processes.9 The
EPA avoided complying with the court's decision by instead conducting
a study from 2000-2004, finding that the injection of certain extraction
materials into coalbed methane wells posed "little or no threat to under-
ground sources of drinking water."10
Despite the EPA's blatant rejection of the Eleventh Circuit's de-
cision in Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation v. EPA, the EPA
continues to work with states to regulate other forms of underground in-
jections.1' Yet, even these controls have proved unsatisfactory and un-
responsive to complaints of underground aquifer contamination. 2 The
.html [hereinafter EVALUATION OF IMPACTS] (noting that the EPA has acknowledged that
the use of diesel fuel as a propping agent exposes formerly pure underground water sup-
plies to dangerous contaminates called "BTEX compounds," which are heavily regulated
under the Safe Drinking Water Act).
'See Energy Policy Act of 2005, sec. 322, § 142 1(d), 119 Stat. 594, 694 (to be codified at
42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)). See also Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative
Federalism: The Perverse Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 719, 772 (2006) (discussing the weakening of federal protection of the environ-
ment from air and water pollution).
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 300h (2000).
8 Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. v. EPA (LEAF 1), 118 F.3d 1467, 1471 (11th Cir. 1997).
9 Id.
1 0 EVALUATION OF-IMPACTS, supra note 5, at ES-16. See id. at ES-1, ES-7.
11 NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE WELLS:
A THREAT TO DRINKING WATER 5 (2002), available at http://www.earthworksaction.org/
pubs/20020lNRDCHydrFracCBM.pdf.
12 See id. at 1-4. The NRDC argued that the Senate should reject section 604 of the pro-
posed Energy Policy Act of 2002. Such rejection would allow coalbed hydraulic fracturing
to be regulated under section 1425 of the Safe Drinking Water Act, rather than take an
all or nothing approach under the more restrictive section, which regulates other oil and
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dangerously vague SDWA statutory requirements regarding oil and gas
extraction have been criticized for favoring the oil and gas industries over
the need to maintain pure drinking water sources. 3 Even in the face of
numerous contamination complaints, 4 the Safe Drinking Water Act con-
tinues to specifically prohibit state restrictions upon "any underground
injection for the secondary or tertiary recovery of oil or natural gas."' 5
Under the current regulation, it appears that the federal government and
its agencies will continue to apply a hands-off approach to oil and gas
fracturing, unless there is clear proof that restrictions are necessary to
protect endangered underground water sources.' 6 Despite complaints
about damages to water safety, plant and animal life, and human health,
the EPA has managed to avoid responsibility and accountability for the
potential damage being caused.' 7 Instead of acknowledging the harmful
gas injection processes. See id. at 1. See generally Energy Policy Act of 2002, S. 1766, 107th
Cong. § 604 (1st Sess. 2001), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc
.cgi?dbname=107_cong~bills&docid=f:sl766pcs.txt.pdf.
" Letter from John D. Bredehoeft, Expert Consultant, Oil and Gas Accountability Project,
to Joan Harrigan-Farrelly, Chief, Prevention Branch, Drinking Water Protection Division,
Office of Ground Water and Drinking Water, EPA (May 15, 2003), available at http'J/www.
earthworksaction.org/pubs/BredehoeftTestimony-HydraulicFracturing.pdf. Bredehoeft
notes that although the EPA admits to diesel fuel's environmentally harmful qualities,
the EPA does not regulate against its use, nor against the use of other toxic chemicals, in
hydraulic fracturing. Id. ("[H]ydraulic fracturing fluids are not fully recovered by sub-
sequent gas development ... The problem fluids that create aquifer contamination are
associated with 1) the use of diesel fuel in the fracking gel, and 2) the use of methanol
as an acid treatment.").
14 See NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 3 (describing complaints from six
counties in both Alabama and Virginia of deteriorating water quality affecting both house-
holds and business operations, i.e., a car wash business near a coalbed methane fracturing
site that could no longer operate due to water contamination). See also EVALUATION OF
IMPACTS, supra note 5, at ES- 13 (listing complaints from citizens in four basins with coal-
bed methane development, regarding water quality and quantity).
15 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(2)(B) (2000).
16 See 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(b)(2) (2000). See also § 300h-2(b) (2000) (describing the available
penalties for violating the requirements of underground injection programs).
" See EVALUATION OF IMPACTS, supra note 5, at 6-1 to 6-16 (noting that no further study
on the potential threat to underground drinking water sources is warranted). See also LISA
SUMI, OIL AND GAS ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, OUR DRINKING WATER AT RISK: WHAT EPA
AND THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY DON'T WANT US TO KNOw ABOUT HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
3 (2005) (noting that fracturing fluids create risk from "eye, skin, respiratory, internal
organ and reproductive disorders, to cancer."); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Consumer Fact-
sheet on: Benzene, httpJ/www.epa.gov/safewater/contaminants/dw_contamfsbenzene
.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2008) (noting that the short term health effects of ingestion
of diesel fuel, a common fracturing fluid, include nervous system disorders and anemia,
while the long term health effects include "[c]hromosome aberrations, [and] cancer.").
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effects of hydraulic fracturing, the EPA blames naturally occurring phe-
nomena for the water problems. 8 The question becomes how clear must
the proof of contamination be before the EPA begins to regulate hydraulic
fracturing under section 300g-1 of the Safe Drinking Water Act. It seems
as though the EPA will continue to find ways to dismiss the all but incrim-
inating evidence of how hazardous hydraulic fracturing truly is.
In response to individual state claims that hydraulic fracturing
processes have contaminated local water sources, the EPA's 2004 study did
little to prove otherwise. Instead of conducting its own independent re-
search, the EPA merely reviewed the data compiled in state agency reports
that were created in response to complaints from areas with nearby coalbed
methane basins. 9 The EPA quickly dismissed the complaints stating, that
during their review of the state reports, they found "no conclusive evidence
that water quality degradation in [underground sources of drinking water]
is a direct result of injection of hydraulic fracturing fluids into CBM wells."2 °
Numerous studies and critiques show that the EPA's 2004 under-
ground injection control program study was nothing more than a lacka-
daisical approach to an incredibly important environmental issue-one
which requires far more aggressive regulation in light of inadequate state
underground injection control programs and contamination complaints
from multiple states.2' The quality of aquifers bordering hydraulic frac-
turing sites is continually at risk from the inordinate amounts of toxic
chemicals that are invariably left behind during the fracturing process.22
Despite the numerous complaints from residents of various states
where hydraulic fracturing occurs,23 the EPA continually avoids creating
a national regulatory scheme with regards to hydraulic fracturing in
18 EVALUATION OF IMPACTS, supra note 5, at ES-13 (blaming "[r]esource development,
naturally occurring conditions, population growth, and historical well-completion or
abandonment practices" for the various types of damages to underground drinking water
sources).
"9 See id.20 Id. (emphasis added).
21 See NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 2; SUMI, supra note 17, at 2 (describ-
ing Weston Wilson, an EPA whistleblower, who called the EPA's study "scientifically
unsound," and suggested that the EPA continue its studies in addition to forming a "peer
review panel" that would be comprised of disinterested parties who do not work for the
oil and gas industries); Bredehoeft, supra note 13.
z See Bredehoeft, supra note 13.
2 See SUMI, supra note 17, at vi (describing residents of Virginia, Alabama, Colorado, New
Mexico, Wyoming, and West Virginia who have experienced reductions in water quality
or quantity as a result of nearby fracturing activities).
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coalbed methane basins. The language mandating the administrative
imposition of a national drinking water regulation is entirely too permis-
sive. Under section 300g-1, the Safe Drinking Water Act only requires the
EPA to create a national maximum contaminate level when the contami-
nate "may have an adverse effect on the health of persons.... [T]here is
a substantial likelihood that [it] will occur in public water systems...
[And such a regulation] is in the sole judgement of the Administrator
[whether] regulation of such contaminant presents a meaningful oppor-
tunity for health risk reduction."24
This note will explore the weaknesses embodied within the Safe
Drinking Water Act that merelypermit the EPA to create national man-
datory drinking water regulations at its discretion. It will suggest that
with respect to hydraulic fracturing, permissive attitudes cannot be toler-
ated; in order to cure the obvious water-contamination problems this pro-
cess creates, nothing short of a national mandatory scheme will suffice.
Section I of this Note will analyze the Safe Drinking Water Act sections
relating to underground injection and explore how the EPA has attempted
to manipulate the statute's linguistic loopholes to avoid regulating hy-
draulic fracturing. Section II of this Note will analyze the 2004 EPA under-
ground injection control program study in relation to the LEAF I and
LEAF II cases, and how the underground injection control study was used
as an evasive tool to avoid complying with two rather thorough Eleventh
Circuit decisions. Section III of this Note will focus on contamination com-
plaints from various hydraulic fracturing states. Finally, Section IV will
propose two solutions to the hydraulic fracturing problem: the EPA should
either regulate hydraulic fracturing under the more lenient section 1425
of the Safe Drinking Water Act or use biodegradable hydraulic fracturing
fluids instead of toxic chemicals.
I. HYDRAULIC FRACTURING & STATUTORY MAYHEM
A. History
The process known as hydraulic fracturing (or "fracking") began in
the early 1940's, when the easily-extracted oil and gas reservoirs began to
deplete in noticeable quantities.25 The purpose of the fracturing process was
24 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (2000) (emphasis added).
25 Les Bennet et al., The Source for Hydraulic Fracture Characterization, OILFIELD REV.,
Winter 2005/2006, at 42, available at http://www.slb.com/media/services/resources/
oilfieldreview/ors05/win05/composite.pdf.
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to allow fuel industries to extract hydrocarbons26 from "low-permeability
reservoirs," or natural underground gas chambers that require massive
amounts of hydraulic stimulation to recover a cost-effective amount of gas
and/or oil.2"
The basic process of hydraulic fracturing is as follows: a combina-
tion of highly pressurized fluids and solvents are combined at the fractur-
ing site, where they are then discharged at great rates of speed towards
a subterranean reservoir.2" Many of the liquids, foams, and solvents mixed
into the fracturing agent are highly controversial because they contain
toxic chemicals that pose serious threats to the purity and safety of under-
ground sources of drinking water ("USDWs").20 These potentially danger-
ous fluids are constantly bombarded against the underground well until
at least one new fracture appears in the surface of the earth or an exist-
ing natural fracture widens.3 ° Once the fractures are created or widened,
sand is injected into the seams of the fracture to ensure that the cracks
remain open during the extraction process.3' To begin coalbed methane
("CBM") extraction, groundwater and "some of the injected fracturing
fluids" are pumped to the surface, but many potential contaminants are
left behind.32
26 "The most common hydrocarbons include petroleum, natural gas, and coal." Oilfeld
Glossary: Term 'hydrocarbon,' http://www.glossary.oilfield.slb.com/Display.cfmn?Term=
hydrocarbon (last visited Nov. 26, 2008).
27 See Bennet et al., supra note 25, at 42.
2See U.S. Patent No. 5,711,376 col. 11.19-28 (filed Dec. 7, 1995), available at http://www
.patentstorm.us/patents/5711376-fulltext.html. See also EVALUATION OF IMPACTS, supra
note 5, at ES-12 ("The fracturing fluids, additives, and proppant are pumped from the
storage tanks to a manifold system placed on the well head where they are mixed just prior
to injections.").29 EVALUATION OF IMPACTS, supra note 5, at ES-12 (noting that because it is possible to
dissolve more fracturing agents per volume in diesel fuel than water, the former is com-
monly used as a base for mixing the propping agents; the EPA admits that the chemicals
contained in diesel fuel are heavily regulated under the SDWA, and do pose a serious
threat to an otherwise sanitary water source). For a detailed discussion of the hazardous
and highly controversial nature of the fracturing fluids see infra Part II.
30 See '376 Patent, supra note 28, at 1. See also Bennet et al., supra note 25, at 43 (noting
that hydraulicly-created fractures tend to exploit the weak structure of underground wells
by expanding the preexisting natural fractures, therefore further enhancing the oil/gas
recovery).
31 EVALUATION OF IMPACTS, supra note 5, at ES-4.
32 Id.
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This multi-billion dollar industrial process has permeated the
United States from coast to coast,33 and today, nearly ninety percent of oil
and gas recovery units use hydraulic fracturing to impel fuel recovery.3 a
It is no wonder why such a powerful industry continues to support the
EPA in evading regulation of such an efficient but dangerous process.
B. The Safe Drinking Water Act & Hydraulic Fracturing
The Safe Drinking Water Act ("SDWA") is full of loopholes through
which the EPA can avoid what should be mandatory regulation of hy-
draulic fracturing activities. First, the permissive qualities of the SDWA
under the "National Primary Drinking Water Regulations" ("NPDWRs")
allowed the EPA to avoid creating a national regulatory regime with re-
spect to methane hydraulic fracturing.35 The NPDWRs were designed to
apply to all public water systems with four exceptions, none of which
should apply to the types of water systems affected by hydraulic fractur-
ing. 36 The EPA has an unjustified degree of discretion under the sections
of the SDWA, which permits an administrative agency to use its "sole
judgment"37 when determining what types of contamination-reducing
technologies are "feasible."3" In choosing which contamination-reduction
processes to use, the EPA generally analyzes whether the costs of com-
plying with a maximum contaminant level are justified by the benefits to
public health.39 Unfortunately, the EPA has ultimately misused this dis-
cretion to create soft regulatory schemes that favor powerful politically-
charged operations, like the oil and gas industries, over any concern for
public welfare.40
3 See Bennet et al., supra note 25, at 42 (stating that in 2005, the major oil and gas
industries spent approximately $3.8 billion on hydraulic fracturing).
SSUM, supra note 17, at vi.
35 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (2000).
3
" Robinson, supra note 4, at 677. The four exempted water systems: (1) systems that do
not sell water, (2) water systems that do not carry passengers between states, (3) systems
that procure water from a system that is not exempt, and (4) systems that merely distrib-
ute water, but lack collection and purification facilities. Id. at 677 n.18.
37 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2000).
38 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(4)(D) (2000).
39 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(6)(A) (2000).
o See Glicksman, supra note 6, at 772-73 (2006) (noting that in regards to environmen-
tally harmful industrial processes that receive exemptions from legislative control, "[tihe
federal government, particularly during the George W. Bush Administration, also has
taken steps to weaken federal efforts to protect the environment from pollution. . ").
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C. Safe Drinking Water Act Section 300g-1: The First Lax
Regulation
SDWA section 300g-1 requires the EPA to establish a maximum
acceptable level for a given contaminant and create a "national primary
drinking water regulation ... if the Administrator determines that-"
(1) the contaminant may adversely affect human health; (2) there is a
"substantial likelihood" that the contaminant will permeate the public
water systems at a rate and quantity that stimulates health concerns; and
(3) "in the sole judgment of the Administrator, regulation of" the contam-
inant presents an opportunity to reduce risks to human health.4 In de-
termining whether a contaminant meets these three permissive require-
ments, the EPA must conduct research and present analysis on seven
factors pertaining to the "health risk reduction benefits" of the regula-
tion which it seeks to adopt.42
In an attempt to safeguard against arbitrary and lackadaisical
research efforts, the statute requires the EPA to base its decision(s) upon
the "best available, peer-reviewed science" and other relevant public infor-
mation.4 3 However, this safeguard is insufficient because it allows the ad-
ministrator to rely on "data collected by accepted methods or best available
methods (if the reliability of the method and the nature of the decisionjus-
tifies use of the data)."' Section 300g-1 of the SDWA contains no caveats,
references, or definitions to qualify the meaning of "accepted" or "best
available" methods-the determination of which is left solely in the hands
of the administration.45 In essence, the administration is allowed to en-
gage in a circular process of assessment; it is free to select "accepted" re-
search that supports its hypothesis, while discarding the rest, as long as
"' 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-l(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (2000) (emphasis added).
4242 U.S.C. §§ 300g-1(b)(3)(C)(i)(I)-(VI) (2000) (describing the seven factors as"quantifiable
and nonquantifiable health risk reduction benefits for which there is a factual basis to
conclude .... .": (1) that reductions in health risks will occur as a result of compliance with
the proposed treatment, (2) that the proposed treatment will target the contaminants
causing the damage, (3) that costs resulting from the regulation are justified, (4) that
"incremental costs" resulting from compliance with the regulation have been considered,
(5) consideration of the contaminant's effect(s) upon the general public as well as upon
children, elderly, and pregnancies, (6) any increased health risks stemming from compli-
ance, and (7) any other"relevant factors," with discretion invested solely-once again-in
the administrative agency) (emphasis added).
4 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-l(b)(3)(A)-(B) (2000).
"42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2000) (emphasis added).
41 Id. (emphasis added).
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the selected research is rubber-stamped with the administration's own
acceptance.' The EPA's 2004 UIC Program Study is proof that as long as
an administrative agency incorporates the appropriate buzz words into
its presentation, like "state agency report," the statutory authorities will
blindly accept as 'fact' whatever the agency decides, without further
inquiry into the thoroughness of the investigation.47
In general, the legislature gives administrative agencies broad
discretion to make decisions about areas of law and policy in which the
agency's expertise is purportedly unparalleled.' Congress relinquished its
discretionary power in these areas to ease the legislature's duty of statu-
tory construction; under the SDWA, the EPA was to use its environmental
expertise to conduct all scientific evaluations and devise the complex
treatment plans, which the legislature lacked the power and know-how to
create.49 Instead, the EPA has used the deference given to it to manipulate
what any reasonable investigation would uncover to be a blatant dismissal
of a statutory obligation to explore a contaminant's cause, methods of
prevention, and overall public policies for (and against) adopting a na-
tional regulatory scheme to limit the scope of damage to USDWs.5 °
During its underground injection control ("UIC") program study,
the EPA conducted minimal amounts of original research, and selected
only those scientific reports that catered to the conclusion that the ad-
ministration sought to reach-that hydraulic fracturing "poses little or
no threat to USDWs and does not justify additional study . ..."" For
example, the EPA conveniently refrained from including reports from
nationally-renowned scientific laboratories, such as the Argonne National
Laboratory, which reported on the toxic nature of multiple hydraulic
fracturing chemicals.52 In its report, the Argonne National Laboratory
concluded that several chemicals frequently used in the extraction process
46Id.
47 See generally EVALUATION OF IMPACTS, supra note 5 (explaining the EPA determination
that it was unnecessary to engage in further studies regarding threats of hydraulic frac-
turing to USDWs, after reviewing state incident reports and a hypothetical model of
potential damages to USDWs).
4 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837,844 (1984) (citations omitted) ("[Clonsid-
erable weight should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory
scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative
interpretations.").
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 300h (2000).
5 See EVALUATION OF IMPACTS, supra note 5, at ES-1, ES-12, 1-1, 7-5 to 7-6; SUMI, supra
note 17, at vii-viii.
51 See EVALUATION OF IMPACTS, supra note 5, at ES-1; SUMI, supra note 17, at vi.
52 See SUMI, supra note 17, at 3.
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"can be lethal at levels as low as 0.1 parts per million," a statistic never
cited in the EPA's UIC program study. 3
Furthermore, it is clear that the EPA has done very little to inves-
tigate the potential health risks associated with chemicals that are not
specifically covered in the current statutory language.' Even more shock-
ingly, the EPA's draft study noted that over ten chemicals associated with
hydraulic fracturing required SDWA regulation, nine of which exceeded
the regulatory standard,55 however, in the final draft of the study, the EPA
either completely removed or favorably altered calculations regarding
most of these chemicals.56 In sum the EPA has abused its discretion for
too long without legislative reprimand. Section 300g-1 of the SDWA re-
mains unamended and authorities remain seemingly unsurprised by the
EPA's blatant refusal to play by the rules.
D. Safe Drinking Water Act Section 300h: Another Sorry Excuse
For a Regulation
Although Congress specifically leaves "blanks" in many of its stat-
utes with the expectation that the relevant administrative agency will fill
them with proposals and policies that only an expert agency could pro-
vide, it is not meant to be a grant of legislative free reign."7 Instead of fill-
ing the SDWA's blanks with expert insight, the EPA has manipulated the
statutory loopholes to reach convenient conclusions, and it has not stopped
at section 300g-1. Section 300h of the SDWA requires the EPA to create
minimum standards with which state UIC programs must comply in order
to gain primary enforcement authority over their own underground injec-
tion activities.5" The statute requires all state UIC programs to prohibit
underground injections unless they are authorized by state permit, and
all programs must include continuous inspection and recordkeeping.59 If
a state program fails to meet the minimum standards, or if an accepted
53 Id. (quoting JA VEIL ETAL., ARGONNE NATL LAB., A WHITE PAPER DESCRIBING PRODUCED
WATER FROM PRODUCTION OF CRUDE OIL, NATURAL GAS AND COALBED METHANE 7-8
(2004), available at http://www.ead.anl.gov/pub/doc/ProducedWatersWP040l.pdf).
' Id. at 9 (noting that where the SDWA lacked standards for maintaining water quality
with respect to certain chemicals, the EPA did little more than refer to its own "Risk-
Based Concentrations" for direction on the types of contaminants that may be hazardous
to human health).55 Id. at 6-8.
56 Id. at6.
" See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984).
58 42 U.S.C. § 300h (2000).59 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h(b)(1)(A)-(D) (2000).
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program is improperly run, the EPA has the authority to take responsibil-
ity as the primary enforcement authority in that area.60 Each state wish-
ing to obtain primary enforcement authority must send its application to
the EPA, along with a description of the regulations proposed to prevent
USDW contamination.6'
The fact that the SDWA outsources broad amounts of discretion
has created additional controversy with respect to whether the states
should have the authority to design their own regulations." Advocates
of "cooperative federalism" support the idea that states can tailor regula-
tions to their specific needs, while being guided by minimum federal stan-
dards.63 Supporters believe that states are in the best position to decide
what types of regulation would be the most effective in combating USDW
contamination in their particular domain.' Critics of federal and state
government cooperation maintain that it is inefficient for states to repro-
duce each other's core research and data collection processes, and that the
federal government should use the same information to form efficient
national standards. 5
As in section 300g-1, the EPA has the sole discretion under section
300h of the SDWA to decide whether to authorize state UIC program pro-
posals, but this section provides an even stronger improper impetus for
the EPA to refrain from regulating hydraulic fracturing activities. Specifi-
cally, the statute prohibits EPA interference with the "underground in-
jection of... fluids which are brought to the surface in connection with oil
or natural gas storage.., or any underground injection for the secondary
or tertiary recovery of oil or natural gas," unless such regulation is "essen-
tial" to protecting the safety of USDWs.16 In terms of when it is "essential"
to regulate a UIC process, the statute specifies that underground injection
will "endanger" USDWs when it can "reasonably be expected" to expose
a public water system to "any contaminant."67 Unfortunately, the 2004
EPA UIC program study treated these sections of the statute as a
60 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-3(a)-(b) (2000) (noting that the administration may also sue to
compel compliance with the minimum levels of statutory requirement).
61 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1) (2000).
62 See Glicksman, supra note 6, at 731-46 (describing both the costs and benefits of allowing
individual states to construct their own types of regulation).
63 Id. at 726-27.
Id. at 778-86.
65Id. at 733-36 (noting that other critics of state regulation claim that states may compete
in a "race to the bottom," by creating laws that are tolerant of potentially hazardous indus-
trial activities in their efforts to attract new businesses).
66 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(2) (2000).
67 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
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complete bar against regulating hydraulic fracturing; it dismissed any
obligation to further explore or regulate hydraulic fracturing when it
stated in its review that hydraulic fracturing presented no "significant
potential threat to USDWs."5
Advocates of divesting the EPA of its power are wary of the fact
that section 300g-1 of the SDWA essentially grants the EPA the sole dis-
cretion to define the contaminants that may"endanger" a USDW, what re-
search to use (or not use) in its definition, and when to mandate national
regulations. 9 These same individuals would most likely see the EPA's
additional authority to decide when a state must regulate its own UIC
activities under section 300h of the SDWA as an anomaly.7 ° The biggest
setback for opponents of administrative discretion occurred in 2005, when
section 300h(1)(d)(B) of the SDWA was amended to specifically exclude
hydraulic fracturing from regulation.7' This section seeks to specifically
exempt from regulation the "underground injection of fluids or propping
agents... pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations ... ,,72 This sec-
tion read alone appears to be the pinnacle of statutory bars on hydraulic
fracturing regulation.73 The anomaly continues when section 300h(d)(1)
of the SDWA is read in conjunction with other statutory sections that re-
quire regulation of many of the individual chemicals used during hydraulic
fracturing processes.
II. THE EPA AND THE LEAF: BATTLE OF THE ACRONYMS
Throughout case law history, arguments over statutory interpreta-
tion have plagued the court system. When an administrative agency applies
its own interpretation of a statute to a certain situation, the court must in-
voke the "Chevron doctrine."74 The Chevron doctrine requires the court
to consider two questions when reviewing the legitimacy of an agency's
6EVALUATION OF IMPACTS, supra note 5, ES-17 (emphasizing certain natural factors that
help mitigate the effects of underground injection, such as biodegradation, absorption, and
dilution of the chemical compounds when mixed into other propping agents).69 See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (2000).
70 See 42 U.S.C. § 300h (2000).
71 See 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). See also Energy Policy Act of
2005, supra note 6.
72 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii) (2000 & Supp. V 2005) (emphasis added).
73 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(2) (2000). The definition of what "endangers" a USDW follows this
exemption-perhaps implying that ifhydraulic fracturing endangered a USDW the statute
would require regulation. Id.74 See CHARLES H. KOCH, Jr., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 12.32 (2d ed. 1997 &
Supp. 2007).
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statutory interpretation. First, the court must decide if Congress has clearly
spoken on the specific issue at hand.75 If Congress has expressed its intent
in a clear and unambiguous manner, the court must apply this interpreta-
tion over any others that the administrative agency may have offered.76 If
Congress has not clearly spoken on the issue at hand, the court is con-
fronted with its second question: if the statute is silent or ambiguous with re-
spect to the specific issue, "the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute."77 If the agen-
cy's statutory construction is "reasonable," the court may not replace it with
another interpretation, especially in light of the deference given to each agen-
cy's adeptness in creating policy within its particular area of expertise.8
On two separate occasions, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
has encountered the Chevron doctrine for the purposes of answering the
following question in the LEAF cases: whether the EPA was correct in
stating that hydraulic fracturing for the purposes of extracting coalbed
methane did not fit into its interpretation of the SDWA's definition of
"underground injection" processes for which regulation is mandated.79
A. LEAF I
The first LEAF case involved a petition to rescind the EPA's ap-
proval of an Alabama UIC program, which engaged in unregulated meth-
ane gas hydraulic fracturing activities on at least eight separate occasions.o
LEAF claimed that the SDWA's guidelines for state UIC programs re-
quired the prohibition of all types of "underground injection," unless the
state obtained an authorized permit for such activities.8 " LEAF claimed
that the nonconforming methane fracturing activities harmed nearby
underground water sources and demanded that the EPA force the state
to reform its UIC program immediately. 2
75 id.
76 id.
7 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). The court may not, however,
apply its own interpretation to the statute where Congress has left "gaps" for the admin-
istrative agency to fill by regulation, unless the agency's interpretation or regulation is
"arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Id. at 843-44.71 See id. at 843-44, 865-66.
79 See LEAF I, 118 F.3d 1467, 1471 (11th Cir. 1997); Legal Envtl. Assistance Found. v.
EPA (LEAF II), 276 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2001).
0LEAFI, 118 F.3d at 1471 n.4.81 Id. at 1469, 1471.
2Id. at 1471. See also 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1)(B) (2000) (noting that before obtaining an
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In response, the EPA ultimately denied LEAF's request to nullify
the Alabama UIC program."3 The EPA claimed that the methane fractur-
ing processes were left properly unregulated because their principal pur-
pose was not that of "underground injection," or extraction processes that
primarily involved the underground "emplacement" of fluids.' LEAF
contended that the EPA's narrow interpretation of processes involving
"underground injection" was inconsistent with the regulatory require-
ments under the SDWA, and that hydraulic fracturing must be regulated
under every valid state UIC program. LEAF further claimed that the EPA
was acting outside of its "statutory authority" in relying on an invalid in-
terpretation of the SDWA to justify its decision to deny LEAF's petition."
LEAF asserted that the SDWA required such regulation because the pro-
cess fit within the statutory definition of "underground injections." 6 The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with LEAF that the methane
extraction processes being used were, in fact, "underground injections"
for the purposes of regulation.87
During its review under the Chevron doctrine, the Eleventh Circuit
held that "it [was] clear that Congress dictated that all underground
injection be regulated under UIC programs," and that hydraulic fractur-
ing fit within the statutory definition of "underground injection."88 The
court found that it was Congress's intent to cast a "wide regulatory net"
over UIC programs that is "not limited to the injection of wastes or to
injection for disposal purposes; it is intended also to cover, among other
contaminants, the injection of brines and the injection of contaminants
for extraction or other purposes."9
underground injection permit, a state must prove that the "underground injection will not
endanger drinking water sources").
83 LEAFI, 118 F.3d at 1472.
84 Id. at 1471.
85 Id. at 1473.
8id. at 1471-72. See also 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1) (2000) (defining "underground injection"
as "the subsurface emplacement of fluids by well injection [but excluding] .... the
underground injection of fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to
hydraulic fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production activities").
s7 LEAFI, 118 F.3d at 1475.
88 Id. at 1474. The court further held that "[n]othing in the statutory definition suggests
that the EPA has the authority to exclude from the reach of the regulations on a activity
(i.e., hydraulic fracturing) which unquestionably falls within the plain meaning of the
definition... ." Id. at 1475.
89 Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 93-1185, at 31 (1974) (discussing the definition of underground
injection and its intended scope).
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B. LEAF II
Upon holding that all types of underground fracturing activities
must be regulated, the Eleventh Circuit made it clear that the SDWA's
statutory loopholes have not only been noticed, but interpreted such that
they should be effectively closed with respect to regulation of hydraulic
fracturing.9' Yet, before the court could carry out a writ of mandamus to
enforce its holding in LEAF I, Alabama threw a monkey wrench into the
equation: a revised UIC program, in which the state purported to have
implemented restrictions upon hydraulic fracturing.91 This diversion
created an opportunity for the EPA to consider approving the revised UIC
program under section 1425, a different and less restrictive section of the
SDWA. 92 This section provides an opportunity for states to show that they
have developed an "alternative showing of effectiveness" of their UIC
programs; if a state can show that its underground injection activities
satisfy the requirements of SDWA section 300h(b)(1)(A)-(D), approval is
warranted. 93 However, section 1425 of the SDWA does not specifically in-
clude hydraulic fracturing in the activities eligible for alternative ap-
proval.94 Thus, to fit the UIC activities under section 1425 of the SDWA,
the EPA classified them as "Class II-like underground injection activities,"
which means that CBM wells fell outside the classification of "Class II
injection wells for purposes of complying with all of the Class II regula-
tory requirements ....
Undistracted by EPA's tactics, LEAF once again challenged EPA's
interpretation of the statutory language, claiming that Alabama's revised
90 LEAF I, 118 F.3d at 1478.
91LEAFII, 276 F.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that the revised Alabama UIC
program would regulate hydraulic fracturing as a "Class II-like underground injection
activity") (emphasis added). See also 42 U.S.C. § 300h-4 (2000) (defining Class II wells
as "wells which inject fluids: (1) which are brought to the surface in connection with
natural gas storage operations, or conventional oil or natural gas production and may be
commingled with waste waters from gas plants... unless those waters are classified as
hazardous waste at the time of injection.").92 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h-4(a)(1)-(2) (2000). See also LEAFII, 276 F.3d at 1257 (noting that
unlike approval requirements under other SDWA sections, the "requirements for those
programs covered under section 1425 are more flexible than the requirements for those
programs covered under [other sections].").93 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h(b)(1)(A)-(D) (2000) (requiring a state UIC program to comply with
minimal statutory requirements, including recordkeeping, monitoring, and reporting, and
proof that the underground injection program will not endanger USDWs).
94 See 42 U.S.C. § 300h-4(a) (2000).95 LEAF II, 276 F.3d at 1262 (emphasis added).
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.UIC program must also be rejected until hydraulic fracturing was prop-
.erly classified and regulated.9" LEAF argued that the EPA's classification
of-all CBM fracturing activities as "Class II-like underground injection
activities" was contrary to Congressional intent.97 Once again, the Eleventh
Circuit ruled in favor of LEAF; the court held that the EPA must classify
hydraulic fracturing into one of the five specific SDWA categories for the
clear purpose of underground injection regulation.9"
C. Life After the LEAF Cases
Despite the Eleventh Circuit's holdings, the EPA continued to
search for alternative means of approval for UIC activities, instead of
complying with the court's orders to regulate hydraulic fracturing in the
same manner as underground injections of other hazardous materials
(i.e., as a Class II well).99 After the LEAF H decision, the EPA has not con-
ducted any other panoptic studies on the environmental effects of hydraulic
fracturing aside from its study ending in 2004, in which it disregarded
multiple states' complaints of water contamination as inconclusive proof
of a direct relationship between the fracturing and water damage.'0° Yet,
some environmentalists remained uneasy in the face of the EPA's blunt
conclusion that the "injection of hydraulic fracturing fluids into CBM
wells poses little or no threat to USDWs and does not justify additional
study... ."'o1 In an attempt to appease the opposition, the EPA entered
an agreement with ninety-five percent of the oil and gas operators that en-
gaged in hydraulic fracturing, which asked the industry to remove diesel
fuel and other toxic substances from the fracturing fluids injected into
USDWs.102 The 2003 Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA") established a
"voluntary agreement" between the EPA and three major oil companies;
any company that agreed to comply with the MOA would have thirty days
from signing the agreement to terminate their use of diesel fuel in hydraulic
96 See id. at 1255-56.
" Id. "According to LEAF, wells used for hydraulic fracturing are Class II wells and
should be regulated as such." Id. at 1262 (emphasis added).
9 See id. at 1264. The court agreed with LEAF that "wells used for the injection of
hydraulic fracturing fluids fit squarely within the definition of Class II wells." Id. at 1263.
99See 42 U.S.C. § 300h-4 (2000); supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
0 See James M. Inhofe & Frank Fannon, Energy and the Environment: The Future of
Natural Gas inAmerica, 26 ENERGYL. J. 349,371 (2005); EVALUATION OF IMPACTS, supra
note 5, at ES-1 to ES-2.
101 EVALUATION OF IMPACTS, supra note 5, at ES-1.
102 Inhofe & Fannon, supra note 100, at 371.
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103fracturing processes. The EPA indicated that the three targeted oil
companies performed ninety-five percent of the hydraulic fracturing
operations in the United States."° In theory, if all three companies signed
the MOA, diesel fuel would be virtually eliminated from hydraulic frac-
turing activities once and for all.' °5
In the end, the MOA did not cast the type of authoritative dye that
was originally hoped for; permissive language permeated the agreement
and stunted its potential for becoming a new regulatory control over hy-
draulic fracturing processes.0 6 In other words, the MOA permitted oil
companies that notified the EPA within thirty days after a decision to
abandon the agreement to "re-institute the use of diesel fuel additives in
hydraulic fracturing fluids injected into USDWs for CBM production."'
In sum, the EPA made only the most minimal efforts to comply with
the Eleventh Circuit's Court of Appeals rulings, which appeared to compel
the EPA towards regulating hydraulic fracturing.' In what seemed to be
a step in the right direction, the EPA drafted a single document designed
to curtail the use of some, but not all,'0 9 toxic hydraulic fracturing chem-
icals: the MOA. The EPA subsequently diluted the agreement's effect
when it made adherence to the agreement completely optional, without
imposing any repercussions on oil companies wishing to re-institute diesel
fuel into their fracturing activities."0 In the face of a company's decision
to retract its compliance with the MOA, the EPA would have "no residual
103 EPA, A MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES EPA AND BJ
SERVICES COMPANY, HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES, INC., AND SCHLUMBERGER
TECHNOLOGY CORP.: ELIMINATION OF DIESEL FUEL IN HYDRAULIC FRACTURING FLUIDS
INJECTED INTO UNDERGROUND SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER DURING HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE WELLS 2,5 (2003) [hereinafter EPA MOA], available
at http://epa.gov/safewater/uic/pdfs/moauic-hyd-fract.pdf.
lO4 EPA, PUBLIC COMMENT AND RESPONSE SUMMARY FOR THE STUDY ON THE POTENTIAL
IMPACTS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE WELLS ON UNDERGROUND
SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER 7 (2004) [hereinafter EPA PUBLIC COMMENT], available at
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uiclpdfs/cbmstudy-attach-uicresp-to-comments.pdf.
105 See id.
'o' See EPA MOA, supra note 103.
10 7 Id. at 5.
'08 See LEAF I, 118 F.3d 1467, 1478 (11th Cir. 1997); LEAF 11, 276 F.3d 1253, 1264-65
(11th Cir. 2001).
109 EVALUATION OF IMPACTS, supra note 5, at 4-5. Specifically, the report discussed diesel
fuel, nitrogen, carbon dioxide, and glycol ethers. The report noted that "diesel is a petro-
leum distillate and may contain known carcinogens," while the other fracturing agents
"can cause negative liver and kidney effects." Id. at 4-4, 4-5.1 0 See EPA MOA, supra note 103, at 2, 5.
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authority to enforce [the MOA] under the Safe Drinking Water Act.""'
This approach to gaining control over hydraulic fracturing concerned
many members of Congress; several of these members immediately pro-
posed amendments to the SDWA to regain control of the unwieldy regu-
latory milieu." 2 While most of the suggested amendments did not pass
muster, a common sense of distrust for the oil and gas industry could
potentially lead to an increased Congressional 'push' towards regulating
hydraulic fracturing in the future. In the words of dissenters,
[tihe oil and gas industry says that it is possible to develop
in an environmentally responsible way, yet this language
would exempt them from pollution control requirements
that other industries have to follow. If they are serious
about their claims, they should follow the rules every other
industry has learned to live with."'
Members of Congress also criticized the final draft of the 2004 EPA study
for its failure to refer to public comments or incorporate valuable insights
from other SDWA affiliates." 4 To this day, the EPA remains unpersuaded
despite Congressional concerns and numerous state complaints;". the regu-
latory solution sought by Congressmen and civilians alike remains at large.
III. STATE COMPLAINTS: SQUEAKY WHEELS BUT No GREASE
Hydraulic fracturing discharge is accused of negatively impacting
the water quality in at least five states, including Virginia, Alabama,
Wyoming, Montana, and Colorado." 6 Since hydraulic fracturing emerged
... See id. at 5.
112 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 108TH CONG., DISSENTING VIEWS
ON ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2003, http://archives.energycommerce.house.gov/legviews/
1081vhr0006-oilgas.shtml (last visited Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter DISSENTINGVIEWS 2003];
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 109TH CONG., DISSENTING VIEWS ON
ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005, http'//archives.energycommerce.house.gov/legviews/1091vhr
1640-oilgas.shtml (last visited Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter DISSENTING VIEWS 2005].
113 DISSENTING VIEWS 2003, supra note 112.
"
4 Id. (noting that the EPA created its final study "[w]ithout the benefit of any hearings
on this matter by the Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous Materials, which
has jurisdiction over Safe Drinking Water Act matters.").
n NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 3-4.
n 6Id. at 3. See also SUMI, supra note 17, at 47 (noting that a private company found
methane in an Alabama citizen's water after complaints that the water was foggy and
had an oily texture. The Alabama Oil and Gas Board tested the citizen's water but only
[Vol. 33:605622
THE NOT-So-SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT
as a popular method of extracting CBM in the 1990s, numerous individuals
and civic associations have filed suit against CBM industries and the
EPA in protest of the fracturing activities." 7 Not only have citizens ap-
plied for judicially-imposed regulations, but environmental groups have
also joined the battle against hydraulic fracturing."8 The combined ef-
forts of both individuals and environmental groups have unearthed, so
to speak, the major underlying issue that must be addressed: whether
hydraulic fracturing is the source of the contamination that these states
are experiencing." 9
Typical complaints from residences located near hydraulic fractur-
ing fields include: greasy or oily films in water, pungent odors, increased
salinity, and even a rise in certain types of cancer. 2 ' For example, the
Hocutt family in Lake View, Alabama complained that their well water
was contaminated with "brown, slimy, petroleum smelling fluid" that
was similar in substance to the hydraulic fracturing runoff from the
for natural pollutants, thus ignoring methane, and the EPA did not test the citizen's water
until six months after the complaint).
117 See, e.g., Swartz v. Beach, 229 F.Supp.2d 1239, 1248 (D. Wyo. 2002) (complaining that
water from a CBM drill site located in Gillette, Wyoming, flowed onto plaintiffs ranch
and caused permanent soil damage due to two major problems resulting from hydraulic
fracturing runoff: (1) increased salinity of USDWs used for irrigation, which killed off
valuable vegetation, replacing it with "salt-tolerant species that are less valuable as
forage," and (2) an increased sodium absorption ratio ("SAR"), which is the measure of
levels of sodium, calcium, and magnesium in a water source). See also San Juan Citizens'
Alliance v. Babbitt, 228 F.Supp.2d 1224, 1226-28 (D. Colo. 2002) (complaining that
additional information regarding the environmental impacts of coalbed methane mining
have surfaced since the EPA's last Environmental Impact Study ("EIS") in 1991.
Plaintiffs demanded the United States Bureau of Land Management to update their
analysis of CBM impacts before they allowed the number of CBM wells in Colorado to
practically double).
"
8 See generally, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 11 (urging the Senate to reject
a section of the proposed Energy Policy Act of 2002).
19 See SUMI, supra note 17, at 41-43 (noting the major deficiencies in the EPA's final report,
including the exclusion of information on the toxicity of hydraulic fracturing chemicals
when mixed together, no information on the concentration of fracturing chemicals found
in CBM discharge water, and conclusions about the benign nature of some fracturing
fluids including benzene, which lack any and all empirical proof or substantive data to
back up EPA's assumptions).
120 NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 3. BRUCE BAIZEL ET AL., CORPWATCH,
HOUSTON WE STILL HAVE A PROBLEM: AN ALTERNATIVE ANNUAL REPORT ON HALLIBURTON
12 (2005), available at http://www.halliburtonwatch.org/about hal/houston.2005.pdf
("Stories of explosive levels of methane in homes, numerous wells simultaneously going
dry, and gobs of black substances smelling of petroleum coming out of taps fed by drinking
water wells were not uncommon in these two regions.").
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USX-Amoco CBM well near their home.'2 ' The family, along with at least
eight other families in the vicinity, developed cancers from an "unknown"
source; several neighborhood residents also noticed that the runoff
seemed to harm or kill nearby vegetation and animals.'22 In response to
these complaints, the EPA collected a mere two samples from the
groundwater surrounding Lake View, and found no "targeted contami-
nants," according to their report.'23 Additionally, Virginia residents
living near CBM sites have filed over one hundred complaints, claiming
damages to their water supplies, but the EPA filed them as damages
resulting from a different type of mining; the National Resource Defense
Council alleged that this was an effort to bury the evidence of hydraulic
fracturing and its harmful environmental impacts.'24
State residents are not the only individuals taking issue with the
EPA's apathetic approach to hydraulic fracturing complaints. In 2004,
an EPA environmental engineer named Weston Wilson blew the whistle
on the EPA's final conclusion that the "injection of hydraulic fracturing
fluids into coal bed methane wells poses little or no threat to USDWs and
does not justify additional study at this time."'25 Wilson stated that the
EPA's study was "scientifically unsound.... that the study's findings
were premature, [and] that hydraulic fracturing may endanger public
health."'26 In response, the EPA maintained their position that hydraulic
fracturing was a safe process, stating that even though there were no
direct studies done on the connection, they "had never found a definitive
example of fracking's effect on human health ... .127 Despite the EPA's
perpetual dismissive habits, scientists, senators, and even other EPA
employees continue to state their distrust for hydraulic fracturing.'28 A
geology professor from the Colorado School of Mines said it all when he
claimed that "[a]bsence of proof is not proof of absence--that's not good
science.
" 121




125 BAIZEL ET AL., supra note 120, at 16.
126 Id.
127 Rebecca Clarren, EPA to citizens: Frack you, SALON.coM NEWS, May 5, 2006, http:/!
www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/05/05/fracking/print.html.12 See id. When an anonymous EPA worker asked about the EPA's efforts to protect human
health, he/she stated that "[t]here doesn't seem to be attention whatsoever to health and
the environment. [The EPA is] ignoring all of their own standards and regulations left
and right. It's just about corporate power to get the gas out." Id.
129 Id.
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Generally speaking, skepticism towards the EPA's approach to
hydraulic fracturing comes from all sides. 30 The EPA even ventured into
the realm of criticizing itself, or accepting some responsibility, but has since
opted to abstain from any attempt to further cleanse itself of its alleged
inadequacies.' 3 ' Specifically, the EPA redacted information from its final
study regarding "mined-through studies" of many CBM wells,132 during
which fluorescent paint was injected into fracturing fluids and tracked
as it moved through man-made and natural fractures.'33 The EPA's draft
studies stated that "hydraulic fracturing fluids can move beyond, and
sometimes significantly beyond, the propped, sand-filled portions of hy-
draulically induced fractures," and yet the 2004 final study did not men-
tion such findings anywhere.' But this wasn't all! The EPA left other
interesting and undesirable findings out of their final study, including
the potential effects of "residual fracturing fluids" on CBM sites that are
fractured more than once, or in more than one place, in a site's lifetime.
35
These omissions are misleading and have caught the critical eye of many
environmentally-concerned individuals and organizations.
136
In the EPA's defense, other noteworthy authorities came down on
the side of hydraulic fracturing. Most notably is a case from the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, in which
the EPA sought to enjoin the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") from
implementing a coalbed methane well development program until the
BLM modified and finalized an environmental impact statement, which
would describe the impact of the proposed CBM extraction projects on
13 See id. (citing criticism regarding the EPA and oil and gas industries from a United
States Senator, collegiate professors, residents living near CBM wells, scientists, envi-
ronmentalists, and citizen organizations).
131 See SUMI, supra note 17, at 22-52.
112 Id. at 34. The EPA conducted mined-through studies in hydraulic fracturing sites in
Pennsylvania, Alabama, West Virginia, Illinois, Virginia, Utah, and Australia. Id.
133 Id. at 34-35.
' Id. at 35 (emphasis removed).
35 Id. at 31-32 (noting that during the initial fracturing process, groundwater is pumped
out to reduce the pressure that holds the coalbed methane underground, which also helps
to flush out the fracturing fluids trapped underground; but during a second-or even
third-fracturing of the same CBM well, less groundwater exists to be pumped out, allow-
ing more fracturing fluids to remain underground, with the potential to contaminate
nearby USDWs).
136 See, e.g., James Murphy, Slowing the Onslaught and Forecasting Hope for Change:
Litigation Efforts Concerning the Environmental Impacts of Coalbed Methane
Development in the Powder River Basin, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 399,411-12 (2007). See
also Clarren, supra note 127 (citing multiple sources of distaste for the EPA and
hydraulic fracturing).
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surrounding areas."' The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's find-
ing that "the challengers failed to show coal bed methane would cause
environmental degradation," because the rate of emissions and amounts
of wastewater produced were much lower than the BLM had predicted.
131
While the Norton decision is all well and good for supporters of
coalbed methane extraction, the BLM failed to mention a particularly
important detail-exactly how they planned on extracting the methane
from the underground wells. 3 s The BLM never once mentioned the words
"hydraulic fracturing" in its brief, nor did the EPA."4 It begs the question
of whether this case has less to do with the EPA's concern for safe drink-
ing water and more concern for deterring abuse of discretion by other
federal agencies over the EPA's oil and gas 'turf.' It seems as though the
EPA is more concerned with abridging the BLM's managerial authority
over the Powder River Basin CBM resources, rather than protecting and
preserving those resources.
In conclusion, despite numerous complaints from residents of mul-
tiple hydraulic fracturing states, related litigation and settlements,'
legislative proposals,'42 and even federal circuit court holdings," the EPA
is steadfast in its belief that hydraulic fracturing should remain virtually
unregulated under the SDWA. Yet, "[mlost of the literature pertaining to
fracturing fluids relates to the fluids' operational efficiency rather than
their potential environmental or human health impacts. There is very
little documented research on the environmental impacts that result from
137 N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, 503 F.3d 836, 840-41 (9th Cir. 2007).138 Id. at 841.
139 See id.
1 o See Responsive Brief for Federal Appellees, N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, Nos. 05-35408,
05-35413, 05-35586, 05-35587 (9th Cir. July 11, 2005); Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-
Appellants, N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, Nos. 05-35408,05-35413, 05-35586, 05-35587
(9th Cir. June 27, 2005); Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, N. Cheyenne Tribe v.
Norton, Nos. 05-35408, 05-35413, 05-35586, 05-35587 (9th Cir. June 24, 2005); Opening
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, Nos. 05-35408, 05-35413,
05-35586, 05-35587 (9th Cir. June 23, 2005); Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, N.
Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, Nos. 05-35408,05-35413,05-35586,05-35587 (9th Cir. June 22,
2005).
141 Clarren, supra note 127 (describing Laura Amos, a Colorado resident, and her plight
after she developed an adrenal gland tumor within two years after an oil company used
hydraulic fracturing in the same underground water source as Amos's drinking water;
the oil company immediately settled the claim, in which both parties were legally forbidden
from disclosing the settlement amount).142 NATURAL REs. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 1 (urging the Senate to amend the SDWA
and to eliminate the exemption for hydraulic fracturing under the regulatory requirements).143 See LEAFI, 118 F.3d 1467 (11th Cir. 1997); LEAFII, 276 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2001).
626 [Vol. 33:605
THE NOT-SO-SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT
the injection and migration of these fluids into subsurface formations,
soils, and USDWs."' It is, therefore, not evident on what basis the EPA
purports to support its pro-fracking stance.
IV. SOLUTION, ACCOUNTABILITY TIME
The SDWA extends a significant amount of federal authority to
force state action in the area of water safety, in order to achieve enhanced
control over the purity of drinking water sources. 45 To further this goal,
Congress required the creation of national primary drinking water regu-
lations, which set maximum contaminant levels for all pollutants that
adversely affect health."'4 The combined regulations also require states
to adopt the maximum feasible regulations to achieve the desired purity
levels, based on the costs of comparable plans.'47 Most importantly, the
SDWA recognizes that underground injection processes subject USDWs to
some of the specified contaminants that can and do affect water safety.'"
A state must adopt regulations at least as strict as those required
under the SDWA in order to obtain federal authorization to control its
own underground injection activities.'49 However, this requirement does
not touch the issue of hydraulic fracturing because the SDWA exempts
the "underground injection of.... fluids which are brought to the surface
in connection with oil or natural gas production or natural gas storage
operations .... unless such requirements are essential to assure that
underground sources of drinking water will not be endangered by such
injection." 5 ° Unfortunately, the latter part of the sentence ("unless...")
has no effect on hydraulic fracturing after the 2004 EPA study concluded
that: (1) the hydraulic fracturing process presents no threat to human
health or to the purity of aquifers, and (2) that no further research or
'4 SUMI, supra note 17, at 42.
141 See Robinson, supra note 4, at 677.
" See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f(1), 300g-l(b)(2)(E) (2000).
14 7 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f(1), 300h-1 (2000).
' See 42 U.S.C. § 300h (2000) (proscribing regulations for the protection of USDWs).149 See Robinson, supra note 4, at 678.
15 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(2) (2000). See also Markus G. Puder & Michel J. Paque, Tremors
in the Cooperative Environmental Federalism Arena: What Happens When a State Wants
to Assume Only Portions of a Primacy Program or Return a Primacy Program?-The
Underground Injection Control Program under the Safe Drinking Water Act As a Case
Study, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 71, 75 (2005) ("In the wake of a Congressional
amendment in 1980, Section 1425 of the SDWA relieves oil and gas-related injection well
programs in the states from having to meet the technical requirements in the UIC regu-
lations.").
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regulation of hydraulic fracturing is currently required upon reaching the
first conclusion.' 5 ' As a result, minimum UIC standards do not mandate
states to regulate hydraulic fracturing, and the EPA has thus far used its
discretion to decide against any national regulatory scheme.
152
The EPA has approved several states' underground injection regu-
latory schemes, including Alabama's,'53 Florida's, and Wisconsin's. 4 The
EPA can approve state UIC programs, or "delegate" the federal power to
the states, under two separate sections of the SDWA, depending on the
"class" of wells located in each state.'55 The EPA can approve of"delega-
tion" of UIC powers by either (1) approving all classes of wells under
SDWA section 1422, or (2) approving only the "oil and gas injection wells
under section 1425 of the SDWA ....,56
Today, the EPA has approved state UIC programs under section
1422 of the SDWA for all well classes in thirty-three states, and it shares
the responsibility of regulating UICs with seven other states. 57 The main
problem lies with the states approved not under section 1422 of the
SDWA, but under section 1425. Under section 1425, the EPA can approve
Class II wells that inject oil and gas-recovery fluids (i.e., fracking fluids)
above USDWs, as long as the EPA determines that the state program
does not allow "underground injection which endangers drinking water
sources."' As seen throughout this note, the EPA's determination that
hydraulic fracturing activities pose "little or no threat to USDWs," has
preempted any mandatory regulation of fracking activities.'59
151 EVALUATION OF IMPACTS, supra note 5, at ES-16.
152 See id.
153 LEAF 1,118 F.3d 1467, 1470 (1997).
" Memorandum from Stephen F. Heare, Director, Drinking Water Protection Division,
OGWDW, to Regions I-X (July 14, 2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/safewater/uidt
pdfs/memouicfy6grantalloc.pdf(discussing tentative grant allocations, for fiscal year
2006, for underground injection control programs).
"'
5 5 See Puder & Paque, supra note 150, at 74-75. Class I wells are used to store industrial
hazardous and nonhazardous wastes and are the most heavily regulated under the SDWA
regarding their placement near a USDW. Class II wells store brines and other fluids used
for oil and gas production. Class III wells are those used for fluids used during mining
operations. Class IV wells are associated with radioactive wastes and are generally pro-
hibited from being located above a USDW. Class V wells inject nonhazardous fluids above
a USDW. See id. at 75.
156 Id. at 76.
157 Id.
15 42 U.S.C. § 300h-4(a) (2000). See EPA, GUIDANCE FOR STATE SUBMISSIONS UNDER
SECTION 1425 OF THE SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT: GROUND WATER PROGRAM GUIDANCE
#19 9.
"' EVALUATION OF IMPACTS, supra note 5, at ES-1.
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As a result of the statutory loopholes, the Alabama UIC program
is one of the only states that includes a regulatory plan for hydraulic frac-
turing, as mandated by the LEAF case.'60 The solution seems clear: until
one of two alternative national regulations is created, a majority of states
will allow unregulated fracking to continue injecting poisonous substances
directly above USDWs, as is currently accepted in Class II wells.
A. First Solution: Apply the SDWA Correctly!
In a "Dear Congress"-esque memorandum written in 2002, the
Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") implored Congress to reject
all proposals to extend the EPA's "moratorium" on regulation of hydraulic
fracturing.'6 ' Instead, the NRDC requested that Congress follow the two
Eleventh Circuit decisions that defined hydraulic fracturing as an under-
ground injection activity that must be regulated under the SDWA as
Class II wells. 1 2 The Eleventh Circuit also held that "regulation of hy-
draulic fracturing under the SDWA can be accomplished using the more
flexible oil and gas injection regulatory provisions in SDWA section 1425,
rather than the more stringent requirements of SDWA section 1422. "163
The EPA is clearly amenable to approving state UIC programs
under section 1422 of the SDWA when a state's program seeks to regulate
all oil and gas injection activities minus hydraulic fracturing.1 4 Because
of the growing concern for the detrimental effects of current fracking
fluids on nearby USDWs, it appears entirely reasonable to require that
hydraulic fracturing activities meet the more lenient standards required
under section 1425 of the SDWA. That is, unless the government is truly
a champion for the oil and gas industries. Dare we say that fracking's
exemption from the SDWA is "an example of how litigation victories can
be undone by a Congress too willing to help the oil and gas industry
without proper regard for the environmental costs [?]"' 6 5 If this is not the
case, then the EPA should prove it. Prove it to the Americans who have
developed rare tumors and have tolerated black, greasy, fizzy water
160 LEAF I, 118 F.3d 1467, 1469 (11th Cir. 1997).
161 NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNcIL, supra note 11, at 1.
.
62 Id. See LEAF I, 118 F.3d at 1478; LEAF H, 276 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2001).
163 NATURAL REs. DEF. CoNcL, supra note 11, at 1.
'" Puder & Paque, supra note 150, at 76.
.65 Murphy, supra note 136, at 411.
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flowing from their taps.'66 Prove it by regulating hydraulic fracturing
under section 1425 of the SDWA.
Regulation under section 1425 of the SDWA would finally impose
reasonable requirements on fracking, which would appease those opposed
to the current laissez-faire system, and would prevent proposals of a zero-
tolerance policy against the process in the future. Using section 1425 of
the SDWA to control fracking would also be consistent with regulation of
all other types of oil and gas extraction as Class II wells, and "would leave
in place two recent US Court of Appeals decisions finding that hydraulic
fracturing is underground injection subject to the public health protection
provisions of the SDWA."16 v
B. Second Solution: "Amend" Fracking Fluids
If Congress refuses to listen to this Note's plea to regulate hydraulic
fracturing under section 1425 of the SDWA, then so be it. Nevertheless,
there is always more than one way to nag Congress. If the government will
not regulate hydraulic fracturing under the current statute, it should at
least require the oil and gas industries to clean up their own act. In other
words, Congress should require the EPA to enter into another "agreement"
with the oil and gas industries as it did in 2003 as mentioned above."6 How-
ever, this "agreement" should contain a less-voluntary, more-mandatory
requirement that the industry refrain from injecting diesel fuel and any
other toxic chemicals into the ground during hydraulic fracturing activities.
If the oil and gas industry complains that without the use of"min-
ute" amounts of these toxic fluids, the extraction process will be inhibited
to the point of sheer inefficiency, there may be an alternative solution to
their problem. If current fracturing fluids were replaced with biodegrad-
able or organic substances, such as ground fruit seeds and nutshells, these
might be a sufficient substitute for the thickness of diesel fuel and other
dense fracturing fluids used today.6 9 In 1967, the United States Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals rejected this idea, 7 ° but advances in
166 SUMI, supra note 17, at 47.
167 NATURAL REs. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 1.
'"See generally EPA MOA, supra note 103 (a voluntary agreement between the EPA and
companies to "eliminate the use of diesel fuel in hydraulic fracturing fluids.").
169 Cf Application of Huitt, 375 F.2d 484,484 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (rejecting a patent appeal
for an invention that used ground nutshells or granular hard plant seeds as a propping
agent).
170 Id. at 488.
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technology since then may lead the oil and gas industry towards innova-
tive fracking techniques involving biodegradable substances. To boost the
industry's compliance with these requirements, the government could
subsidize the use of biodegradable fracking substances, give tax breaks,
or even assist in research and development efforts to explore suitable
organic fracturing fluids.
CONCLUSION
It is true that CBM extraction provides natural gas to power count-
less activities around the world, but without a healthy environment, that
power is useless. The EPA cannot continue to ignore hydraulic fractur-
ing's potential side effects upon the environment. This Note is not asking
the EPA to develop extremely complex or novel substitutes for hydraulic
fracturing; it is merely asking the EPA to comply with that which has
already been asked of it under the SDWA.
Regulating fracking under a satisfactory, yet less rigid section of
the SDWA, such as section 1425, would provide structure to this previ-
ously unregulated oil and gas activity. Regulating underground injections
associated with hydraulic fracturing as Class II wells would not require
any further legislative development on the part of Congress, nor any fur-
ther legislative interpretation on the part of the EPA. Section 1425 of the
SDWA is familiar territory for the EPA, and the EPA is more than compe-
tent to regulate oil and gas-related activities under its terms, including
hydraulic fracturing.
If the SDWA does not suffice as a solution, research and develop-
ment could reveal organic or biodegradable substitutes for dense frack-
ing fluids. Injection of natural compounds above USDWs would not have
the negative effects associated with diesel fuel and other fracking fluids
currently in use.'7 ' Even though this area is less familiar to the EPA, it
is certainly a reasonable alternative, and it is one that may even cost less
than diesel fuel-not to mention reduce the United States' dependency
on foreign oil sources!
The EPA can only hide its true motivations for exempting hy-
draulic fracturing from regulation for so long, while it continues to regu-
late every other oil and gas-related activity under the SDWA. It is too
speculative to say whether the EPA is acting as a champion of the oil and
171 See NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 11, at 3 (showing several examples of nega-
tive effects associated with contamination of USDWs near hydraulic fracturing wells).
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gas industry, but if it continues down this path, this Note would not be the
first to suggest such an idea. 172 The EPA should clean up its act, and more
importantly, clean up our waters, preferably before our faucets emit black,
smelly substances 173 from allegedly nonthreatening UIC activities.
.
72 See Murphy, supra note 136, at 411.
173 See SuMI, supra note 17, at 47.
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